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The mind-body problem is one of the deepest 
puzzles of philosophy.  It is the problem of giving an 
account of how the mind or mental  processes are related 
to bodily states or processes. Ever since its beginning in 
antiquity the problem has intrigued philosophers and 
theologians.  Even today  philosophers of mind, 
neuroscientists and psychologists are all concerned with 
this problem.  Since René Descartes (1596- 1650) 
introduced the famous Cartesian Dualism, separation of 
mind and matter into two different but interacting 
substances, much discussion has followed.   Current 
debate in philosophy of mind has become too technical for 
a layman to follow although the mind/body problem 
continues to enjoy a great popular appeal.  We ask like 
Susan Greenfield  (Greenfield  2002) How does a wrinkled 
lump of grey matter weighing little more than a kilogram  
manage to think, love, dream and feel such widely different 
sensations as raw pleasures and    numbing depressions?  
This of course assumes that the human brain is the seat of 
all mental activity.   
 
2. The problem 
It has been customary to divide   loosely the 
problems about the human mind into easy and hard ones.  
The former refer  to empirical  brain research and 
experimental psychology, implying that  there are no 
mysteries and we are making rapid progress in these 
fields.  On the other hand there are philosophical problems  
about the relation between mind and body which can be 
termed the hard problems. Whether there has been  any 
progress in the philosophy of mind over the years is 
debatable.  The answer would depend on what we mean 
by philosophy and by progress. 
A principal problem in the philosophy of mind, as 
already mentioned, was kicked off by René Descartes by 
postulating two different kinds of substances in our bodies: 
res cogitans (mind) and res extensa (matter). This crude 
form of substance dualism opened up so many difficulties 
(how to fit it in with all our beliefs of science?) that it is no 
longer pursued by either scientists or philosophers 
perhaps with the exception of  Karl Popper or John Eccles. 
According to Franz Brentano (1838-1917) the 
mentality of mental phenomena consists in their 
intentionality—their aboutness  or their being directed upon 
an object.  Many of my beliefs, desires, intentions are 
directed to external objects.  But how could processes in 
my brain be about anything?  Of course, there are many 
mental activities and emotions which are not about 
anything in particular. 
The problems of the mind can be enumerated in 
terms of further ideas, e.g. Mental Causation or Intentional 
Causation: How could a conscious mental state have any 
impact  on a physical object such as a human body? 
The major problem, however, remains the problem 
of Consciousness (or self-consciousness), the feeling of 
subjectivity, the feeling of ‘I’.  Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 
stated that consciousness  was the greatest wonder of all 
wonders. David Chalmers opens his new book  The 
Conscious Mind ( Chalmers 1996) as follows:  What is 
Consciousness? Conscious experience is at once the most 
familiar thing in the  world and the most mysterious. There 
is nothing we know about more directly than 
consciousness, but it is far from clear how to reconcile it 
with everything else we know.  Another recent book  
Conscious Experience edited by Thomas Metzinger ( 
Metzinger1995) begins with these words: How can 
consciousness arise in a physical universe? …Today, the 
problem of consciousness – perhaps together with the 
question of the origin of the universe – marks the very limit 
of human striving for  understanding. To quote another 
expert:  Consciousness is almost certainly a property of 
the physical brain.  The major  mystery, however, is how 
neurons achieve effects such as   being aware of a 
toothache or the smell of cinnamon.  Neuroscience has not 
reached the stage  where we can satisfactorily answer 
these questions…no one would say we pretty much 
understand the neurobiological mechanism of awareness 
(although Dennet’s book title Consciousness Explained 
(Dennett 1991), rather misleadingly suggests otherwise. 
(Patricia Smith Churchland in (Metzinger 1995, p.185)) 
 
3. Some Current Views on the Mind-Body 
Problem 
Starting from Ryle’s classic  The Concept of Mind 
(1949), through writings of philosophers like Wittgenstein, 
Davidson, Searle, Dennett, Chomsky, Nagel, McGinn, 
Smart, Armstrong, Fodor and many others up to today’s 
work in Cognitive Science, the current status of  the 
philosophy of mind is too vast to be meaningfully 
summarised by me. I can only attempt a subjective 
thumbnail picture. 
We can see basically two schools of thought:  
1. The mind-body problem, or the problem of 
consciousness can never be understood fully however 
much we may learn about the functions of the brain. We 
may call this a mysterian or pessimistic view. A related 
view is that we are asking needlessly meaningless 
questions which cannot be answered. 
2. We are getting closer to an understanding of 
consciousness by the advances in neuroscience and 
cognitive science, notwithstanding the fact that science 
does not claim to be able to explain everything. 
Philosophers can be divided  into Dualists and 
Monists.  Dualists like Descartes may be rare nowadays  
but many philosophers do not accept that matter alone can 
explain mental phenomena and seem to suggest a milder 
form of dualism..  They argue that  any objective physical 
science would leave an ‘explanatory gap’ failing to 
describe what it is like to have a particular experience and 
failing to explain why there are phenomenal experiences at 
all. 
Other philosophers, called Naturalists or 
Physicalists or  adherents  of Identity Theories (mental 
events are identical with physical events)  assert that 
matter is all that there is  for us to study.  Consciousness 
appears as an emergent property from matter, they say. 
Or, better still, it is suggested that once we develop the 




right concepts and ask the right questions we will be able 
to solve the mind-body problem once and for all.   
Wittgenstein has recorded vast amount of his 
reflections on mental states and subjectivity.  Without 
going into his thoughts on private language argument or 
access to the inner, we can just recall his repeated  
declaration that the problems of philosophy would vanish if 
we attended properly to language.  As an example he 
reminds us that in thinking about the mind we are often in 
the grip of a picture whose application we do not fully 
understand ( Metzinger 1995 p.133) 
A group called Eliminativists (or Eliminative 
Materialists) counsel the abandonment of the whole set of 
terms consciousness, self, qualia that usher in the 
problems of mind and body. 
In the heyday of Artificial Intelligence a 
computational model of the mind (neuro-anatomy and 
chemistry don’t matter)was proposed, but Searle with his 
Chinese Room example and others have convincingly 
shown that a computer or a Turing machine cannot have 
what we call consciousness. 
The theory of mind currently in vogue with 
cognitive scientists  is known as functionalism.  
Functionalism is the modern successor to behaviourism. 
and arguably is the most influential position on the mind-
body  relation today (Honderich 1995  p.579). 
Functionalism says that mental states are constituted by 
their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs 
and behavioural outputs. (Guttenplan 1994 p.323) 
 
4. Nature of Philosophy and Progress in 
Philosophy 
Philosophy can be taken either as a guide to life or 
as a clarification of our concepts (Sanatani 2001). Despite 
rumours about the death of analytical philosophy, we 
prefer the  modern Anglo-American style of philosophising 
and  appreciate the views of Wittgenstein on the nature of 
philosophy. W.V. Quine and Bertrand Russel thought 
philosophy as an extension of science, Wittgenstein 
differed.  The following quotations  will give an idea of 
Wittgenstein’s views.(Sanatani 2001) 
Philosophy is wholly distinct from science, and its  
methods and products are not those of the sciences. (NL) 
The object of philosophy is the logical clarification 
of thought.  
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations. (T 4.112) 
Philosophy is not a cognitive pursuit; there are no 
new facts to be discovered by philosophy; only new 
insights. ((PR; PG 256)   
Philosophy seeks to establish an order in our 
knowledge of the use of  language (PI #132) 
The philosopher’s treatment of a question is  like 
the treatment of an  illness. (PI 255) 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment  of 
our intelligence by means of language. (PI 109)  
A main source of our failure to understand is that 
we do not survey (übersehen) the use of our words.  Out   
grammar is lacking  in perspicuity (Übersichtlichkeit) . A 
perspicuous representation produces this understanding, 
which consists in seeing connections.. ..(PI 122) 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and  
neither explains  nor deduces anything… (PI 126) 
With such views Wittgenstein would have hardly 
believed in the progress in the philosophy of mind, or for 
that matter in any type of philosophy over the ages. But 
then how to evaluate the production of page after page of 
philosophical writings, including perhaps 30,000 pages by 
Wittgenstein himself?  One might ask, like John Haldane, 
Has Philosophy Made a Difference and Could it be 
Expected To? (O’Hear  2001). 
According to Haldane  a common complaint seems 
to be that philosophy is characterised by a general and 
marked failure to make progress.  What was being  
discussed in antiquity about substance, identity, time, 
knowledge, value and virtue.. is still being debated today 
with no incontestable sign of advance let alone of 
resolution.   Haldane  further says   that this complaint 
comes not only from outside philosophy but is also heard 
from within philosophy , especially from those attracted to 
a scientific conception of philosophy.(O’Hear 2001, p.155). 
Like Wittgenstein we do not accept a scientific 
view of philosophy. We believe philosophy should clarify 
our questions and thereby somehow show if our questions 
are at all answerable or not. If a question is clearly 
answerable and objectively verifiable, it ceases to be a 
philosophical question and ends up being a scientific one 
as has often happened in the past. There are no new 
philosophical questions to discover only new insights are 
provided by worthy philosophers. A philosophical analysis 
throws fresh light on age-old problems and provides 
valuable insight but rarely gives a clear-cut yes/no answer 
or prescribes  what we should or should not do. Again with 
Wittgenstein we believe philosophy has a therapeutic 
value, it can remove our intellectual worries and bring us a 
peace of mind.  In other words, philosophy as a discipline 
is one that soothes rather than solves but is no less 
constructive or important for that. 
These remarks can be illustrated by the current 
status of the mind/body problem. The scientific study of the 
brain has made remarkable progress.  But the age old 
philosophical questions remain unanswered.  With the  
proposal of new theories and models the modern 
philosophy of mind has become a very rich , and at the 
same time a technical field  where only a specialist can 
find his way. But we have still not found within our brains 
the seat of consciousness, nor any   extra-material 
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